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The impact of media attention on the use of alternative earnings 
measures 
The practice of reporting earnings measures that deviate from generally accepted 
accounting principles (non-GAAP measures) has received negative attention in the media. 
Regulators argue in favour of reporting GAAP earnings measures and utter their concerns 
that investors may be misled by the use of non-GAAP measures. In a period of increased 
regulatory concern for these reporting practices, we explore whether there has been a 
shift away from the use of non-GAAP metrics. We analyse a sample of earnings press 
releases in the period 1999-2004 from companies listed at Euronext Amsterdam. Our 
findings indicate that reporting non-GAAP measures is a common practice and that the 
frequency of reporting non-GAAP earnings measures has increased despite the concerns 
voiced by regulators. On the other hand, investors seem to have become more hesitant 
towards the use of alternative earnings measures for their decision-making. Our findings 
suggest that investors find non-GAAP measures informative before 2003, but they turn 
away from these measures in the following years and price GAAP earnings metrics 
instead. Together, these findings suggest that the negative media attention for non-GAAP 
measures has influenced the perception of investors, but not of managers. 
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1 One of the controversial areas in financial reporting that received considerable media 
attention following recent corporate scandals is the disclosure of self constructed earnings 
measures. Regulators such as financial market authorities and accounting standard setters 
repeatedly expressed their worries about the possibly misleading use of financial 
information that does not comply with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), 
i.e. non-GAAP measures. In the U.S., the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 and 
pursuant SEC regulation have addressed the practice of non-GAAP reporting, allowing it 
only under strict conditions. Recent U.S. studies report that non-GAAP regulation seems 
to be effective, in the sense that the reporting practices became less opportunistic (e.g. 
Heflin and Hsu, 2007). Additionally, investors seem to react more strongly to non-GAAP 
information after the SEC regulation (Marques, 2006). Still, the reporting environment 
changed in various ways, regulatory changes being only one factor.  
In this study we focus on the influence of media attention on both firms’ reporting 
behaviour and investors’ response to the reported information. We argue that media 
attention directed at misleading non-GAAP information has increased awareness for the 
use or potential abuse of these alternative earnings measures and has a substantial 
influence on the behaviour of companies and investors. To study the impact of the media 
in the U.S. is difficult, since all listed companies are affected by substantial new 
regulation. This would create the problem of disentangling the effect of regulation from 
the effect of media attention. We circumvent this problem by exploring non-GAAP 
reporting in the setting of the Dutch financial market. The practice of non-GAAP 
reporting also induced a sharp debate in the media in the Netherlands
1, however in this 
case regulators and policy makers did not respond with additional regulation similar to 
SOX. Hence, the Netherlands allows us to study reporting practices and, more 
specifically, the use of non-GAAP earnings measures of Dutch publicly listed companies 
in an environment of changing public opinions and negative media attention. 
Our contribution to the literature is threefold. First and most importantly, we 
contribute to the debate concerning the effectiveness of regulation in general and SOX 
more specifically. SOX has been criticized for being a hasty overreaction to corporate 
                                                 
1 For example, the speech delivered at the presentation of the Henri Sijthoff award, an influential annual 
award for the best corporate financial report for Dutch listed companies, was very critical towards the 
growing popularity of self-constructed earnings measures (Het Financieele Dagblad, 14 October 2002) 
 1 scandals, imposing substantial costs on companies without compelling evidence that this 
would create economic benefits (Romano, 2005). This assumes that financial regulation 
should be based on scientific evidence, an argument that was made more explicitly by 
Buijink (2006). He suggests that an evidence-based approach may be impossible for 
financial regulators due to the lack of relevant research. Since the implementation of 
SOX however, the number of empirical studies on financial regulation is rising. Several 
recent studies evaluate the economic consequences of SOX, for example going dark or 
going private decisions (Hostak, et al., 2006; Engel, et al., 2007) or the attractiveness of 
the U.S. markets to foreign companies (Piotroski and Srinivasan, 2006; Litvak, 2007). 
The papers that focus on financial reporting, mostly  infer the effects of SOX by 
comparing some characteristic of financial reporting before and after the Act became 
effective (Bartov and Cohen, 2007; Cohen, et al., 2007;Kolev, et al., 2008; Marques, 
2006) These studies inevitably suffer from the problem that the effect of SOX cannot be 
isolated and that other factors may have caused the observed changes in financial 
reporting (Coates, 2007; Leuz, 2007).  Our paper helps to understand the incremental 
effect of SOX, by exploring if and how companies and investors change their behaviour 
in the absence of such a regulatory shock.  
Second, our study adds to the growing literature on the effects of media on 
financial markets. While other studies try to infer the effect of company specific media 
coverage on stock prices (Dyck and Zingales, 2003) or on corporate governance 
characteristics (Dyck, et al., 2006; Louis, et al., 2005), we focus on the effect of media 
coverage from a financial reporting, i.e. disclosure, perspective. 
Third, we provide additional evidence on the use of alternative earnings measures. 
Recent studies have examined the use of non-GAAP measures as reported in earnings 
releases in the United States (Bhattacharya, et al., 2003; Bowen, et al., 2005;Lougee and 
Marquardt, 2004). A vast majority of the international accounting literature stresses the 
importance of institutional factors and market forces in shaping management’s incentives 
to report informative earnings measures (Ball et al., 2003). To our knowledge, no 
research has been conducted on the use of alternative earnings measures outside the 
United States and Canada. 
2 We report evidence that the practice of reporting non-GAAP earnings measures in 
earnings press releases is popular in the less regulated reporting environment of the 
Netherlands. First, we analyze the financial reporting environment during the period of 
interest (1999-2005) and describe a dynamic environment that leads to increased negative 
attention from the media and regulators for non-GAAP reporting. We then measure the 
popularity of non-GAAP reporting in terms of reporting frequency and prominence. 
Companies increasingly report non-GAAP earnings measures in corporate press releases 
during a period in which these measures receive negative attention in the media. 
Furthermore, we report evidence of opportunistic non-GAAP reporting and this 
behaviour persists after negative media attention. From these results we infer that 
companies do not adjust their reporting behaviour after negative media attention for these 
particular reporting practices. 
We then explore whether investors use non-GAAP information as a basis for their 
decisions. We investigate the association between abnormal returns and non-GAAP 
earnings as well as GAAP earnings. On average, our results suggest that investors do not 
find non-GAAP measures to be more informative than GAAP operating earnings. This 
contrasts with U.S. findings, where Lougee and Marquardt (2004) and Bhattacharya et al. 
(2003) find evidence suggesting that investors find non-GAAP earnings measures 
informative. However, when identifying the development over time, we find that prior to 
2003 investors seem to price non-GAAP earnings rather than operating earnings as 
defined under GAAP. Starting 2003, the situation changes, as investors seem to turn 
away from non-GAAP measures and start to price GAAP operating earnings instead. In 
all of the defined models, GAAP bottom-line earnings are informative. Overall, we 
conclude that although investors seem to turn away from non-GAAP information as a 
result of the negative media attention, companies do not adjust their reporting behaviour 
accordingly. 
We interpret our empirical results as evidence for the conjecture that the use of 
financial reporting information can change in the absence of any regulatory intervention. 
This study shows that investors’ perception of specific reporting practices change as a 
result of the public debate, and more specific, media attention. Investors that become 
more aware of the possibly negative aspects of certain (non-GAAP) earnings measures 
3 apparently ignore these disclosures, as they have become less credulous. On the other 
hand, media attention does not seem to affect firms’ reporting behaviour, as they continue 
to report non-GAAP measures at least as frequently and as prominently as before. These 
findings are particularly relevant for standard setters, policy makers and financial market 
participants, since the debate on the negative consequences of a regulatory overload is on 
a new high. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The effectiveness of regulation 
The effectiveness and desirability of regulation of financial markets has long been 
debated (e.g. Stigler, 1964). In the aftermath of recent corporate scandals, regulators 
imposed far-reaching regulation on financial markets to restore investors’ trust. These 
new regulations, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley law of 2002, stirred up the discussion on the 
effectiveness of regulation and led to several academic studies discussing the costs and 
benefits of SOX (e.g. Romano, 2005; Coates, 2007; Leuz , 2007).  
The effects of SEC warnings and regulations concerning non-GAAP reporting 
have been investigated in a number of studies. When analysing firms’ reporting 
behaviour, Marques (2006) and Heflin and Hsu (2007) document that the frequency of 
non-GAAP reporting declines significantly after SEC intervention. Marques (2006) 
distinguishes between the SEC warning in 2001 and Regulation G in 2003 and finds that 
the probability of reporting non-GAAP earnings is not affected by the SEC warnings. For 
other non-GAAP information, the frequency decreases after the SEC warning and 
additionally after SEC regulation. Heflin and Hsu (2007) find evidence that the SEC 
regulation effectively curbed opportunistic non-GAAP reporting, as the probability of 
meeting an earnings benchmark using non-GAAP measures decreases significantly after 
the regulation.  Entwistle et al. (2006) study the impact of non-GAAP regulation of the 
SEC on reporting behaviour of firms between 2001 and 2003. They find that the number 
of firms reporting non-GAAP information after the introduction of SEC regulation 
declines sharply. They also report that by 2003 the reported non-GAAP information is 
less biased and presented less prominently. Kolev et al. (2008) analyse the change in non-
GAAP reporting behaviour in more detail by examining the relative quality of the 
4 exclusions from GAAP earnings. They find that after SEC intervention the predictive 
ability of the exclusions improves.  
These results seem to suggest that the regulation was effective in the sense that 
non-GAAP reporting became less opportunistic. On the other hand, the decreasing 
frequency of non-GAAP reporting may also imply that the more informative reporters 
stopped publishing non-GAAP measures (Marques, 2006; Heflin and Hsu, 2007).  More 
evidence of unintended negative consequences is reported by Kolev et al. (2008). They 
find that the quality of reported special items deteriorates after SOX. They interpret their 
results as evidence that managers adapt to the stricter regulation by replacing 
opportunistic non-GAAP reporting with manipulating special items.  
Besides companies’ reporting behaviour, investors’ reaction to non-GAAP 
information has been analyzed as well. Investors’ response to non-GAAP measures has 
been has been compared to the response to GAAP earnings in several studies. Studies 
based on actual press releases found that investors find non-GAAP earnings more 
informative than GAAP earnings (Bhattacharya et al., 2003, Lougee and Marquard, 
2004), more persistent (Bhattacharya et al., 2003) and cause stronger revisions to 
analysts’ beliefs (Bhattacharya et al., 2003). In sum, this evidence suggests that the 
‘flexible’ non-GAAP reporting leads to information that investors find useful.  
More recently, a number of studies analyze investors’ reactions to non-GAAP 
information before and after the implementation of SOX and Regulation G. For example, 
Heflin and Hsu (2007) find weak support for an increase in earnings informativeness 
after the implementation of Regulation G. Additionally, Marques (2006) reports that 
investors react more positively to non-GAAP disclosures after the regulation became 
effective. However, when she splits the exclusions from GAAP earnings, she finds that 
market does not respond to non-GAAP adjustments made by firms that deviate form 
adjustments made by analysts.  A possible explanation for these results is that SEC 
Regulation increased the credibility of non-GAAP disclosures.  
Taken together, the U.S. evidence suggests that SEC regulation has influenced the 
use of non-GAAP disclosures, but that there may also be unintended consequences that 
effectively decrease the quality of reported financial information. Moreover, studies that 
examine the effectiveness of regulation face the problem of contemporaneous changes in 
5 the reporting environment. Our research design enables us to address precisely that issue 
and ask what would happen in the absence of additional regulation. We first analyze the 
reporting environment and identify media attention for non-GAAP reporting as a 
changing characteristic that likely influenced companies and investors. 
 
Media attention  
We assume that negative media attention for non-GAAP disclosures changed the 
reporting environment. The potential for media attention to affect companies’ behaviour 
has received some attention in previous studies. For example, Dyck et al. (2006) find that 
press coverage increases the probability of companies taking action to improve corporate 
governance. Louis et al. (2005) explore the impact of Business Week’s publication of the 
worst corporate board officers and find that companies take action to improve corporate 
governance after negative media coverage  and change their financial reporting strategy. 
On the other hand, Core, et al. (2007) find no evidence that negative press coverage 
influences executive compensation. 
Some empirical studies investigate the effect of press coverage on investors’ 
trading decisions. An early study by Foster (1979) analyses the effect of the critical 
articles by Brilofff, who is famous for his exposures of accounting malpractices. Foster 
finds an average drop in price of 8% for companies whose accounting practices are 
criticised by Briloff. Dyck and Zingales (2003) find that stock prices react most to the 
earnings metric that is emphasized by the press. In their study to the effect of Business 
Week’s list of worst board members, Louis et al. (2005) find that individual investors 
overreact to this negative media coverage.  
The empirical evidence from previous research on the effect of media coverage is 
based on press coverage of individual companies. Instead, we focus on newspaper articles 
that deal with the more general financial reporting issue of non-GAAP reporting. This 
media attention is likely to change the impact of earnings announcements on financial 
market participants. Assuming the influence of media attention on company’s behaviour 
works through reputation based mechanisms, as Dyck et al. (2006) suggest, this relation 
6 is probably stronger in case of company specific media attention
2. Investors’ decisions on 
the other hand, are influenced by the media because they can provide credibility. (Dyck 
and Zingales, 2003). Conversely, media attention can also destroy credibility. Mercer 
(2004) identifies the level of external assurance as one of the four factors influencing 
disclosure credibility. Although the evidence is largely anecdotal, the opinions expressed 
in the financial press can provide external assurance. Similarly, negative media attention 
for certain disclosure practices will harm the credibility of that information and make it 
less useful for economic decisions. Building on this literature, we argue that the media 
attention for the misuse of non-GAAP information created more awareness and 
consequently influenced the behaviour of companies as well as investors.  
 
THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENT OF NON-GAAP REPORTING 
 
We argue that changing regulation is only one aspect that may influence the disclosure 
choices and the use of financial information. To illustrate our point, we focus on the 
changes in the financial reporting environment that relate to the use of non-GAAP 
metrics. Figure 1 depicts a timeline with important changes in the financial reporting 
setting.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 about  here] 
 
Most notably, during the period of interest the first major accounting scandals in both the 
U.S (Enron in 2001) and the Netherlands (Royal Ahold early 2003) were revealed. Partly 
in response to these frauds, regulators issued several statements that directly implicated 
the practice of reporting non-GAAP information. Since a description of the financial 
reporting environment is important for our analysis, we describe the developments in 
some more detail. 
                                                 
2 For example, when a company’s name is in the heading of a newspaper article on specific financial 
reporting practices, the company may be more inclined to respond than when its name is not mentioned at 
all. 
7    In the Netherlands, the emergence of non-GAAP
3 earnings measures in financial 
reports coincides with changes in the accounting standards. From 2001 onwards a new 
accounting directive by the Dutch Accounting Standards Board (DASB) was effective 
that required goodwill to be capitalised and amortised. Before 2001, acquired goodwill 
was usually set off against retained earnings. The DASB’s accounting guidelines, 
however, are not legally enforceable. Because of this leeway in the regulation, some 
companies chose to ignore the guidelines. This led to a decreased comparability of 
reported net earnings. Anecdotal evidence suggests that among companies that did 
capitalize goodwill, reporting earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization (EBITDA) became popular. This non-GAAP earnings measure allowed 
them to avoid the negative effect of goodwill amortization on net earnings. This suggests 
that the changing accounting guideline for recording goodwill gave rise to non-GAAP 
reporting in the Netherlands. In the U.S., reporting EBITDA or similar earnings measures 
was already widespread by that time. The SEC issued a warning in 2001, with the intent 
to caution companies on their reporting of non-GAAP measures and to call the dangers of 
these measures to the attention of investors.  
In 2002 the DASB emphasised that non-GAAP measures such as EBITDA cannot 
be reported in the profit and loss account, as they are inconsistent with the prescribed 
presentation formats
4. The statement was issued as guidance to explain the application of 
current regulation and explicitly applied to the financial statements only. For example, 
disclosure of EBITDA in the footnotes to the financial statements does not violate the 
prescribed formats and is therefore allowed according to the DASB. Alternative earnings 
measures had not been dealt with by the standard setter before. The timing of this 
statement however, indicates that the practice of non-GAAP reporting had caught the 
attention of the accounting standard setter possibly in response to media attention and the 
developments in the U.S. Although the statement is not applicable to interim reports or 
press releases, the DASB gave a clear signal that any earnings measure that does not fit in 
                                                 
3  In the Netherlands, the term generally accepted accounting principles.(GAAP) is not defined formally. 
Instead, the accounting practice is based on the law, the body of case law and guidelines as set by the 
DASB. Together, the regulation from these three sources is referred to as .Dutch accounting rules. 
4 The Dutch accounting rules are based on a legal framework, covered in Volume 2, Part 9 of the 
Netherlands Civil Code. The law prescribes the formats in which the financial statements have to be 
published. 
8 the prescribed format of the profit and loss account is considered to be a deviation from 
GAAP. However, the statement does not qualify as new regulation of non-GAAP 
reporting, nor does it affect earnings releases. Moreover, in the absence of enforceability 
the guidance was regarded as advisory rather than prescriptive by some companies. 
Following the Sarbanes-Oxley law of November 2002, the SEC established rules 
to regulate the disclosure of non-GAAP financial measures. Early 2003, the SEC reduced 
the flexibility in non-GAAP reporting considerably with the passing of Regulation G.  
This rule requires all publicly disclosed non-GAAP information to be reconciled with 
GAAP information. Furthermore, management has to explain why the non-GAAP 
information is relevant for investors. In addition, the GAAP information must be 
presented with the same prominence as the non-GAAP information. Besides the costly 
expanded disclosures that are required under Regulation G, management is also exposed 
to the risk of litigation if the requirements are not met.  
Similar to the U.S. debate, the media in the Netherlands warned against the use of 
alternative earnings measures
5. In 2004, the Dutch professional accountants and auditors 
organization, Royal NIVRA, investigated the annual statements of listed companies for 
the years 2002 and 2003 and found that alternative measures such as EBITDA are 
reported frequently
6. In a research report by the Dutch Financial Market Authority 
(AFM), the various earnings measures reported in the annual reports over 2002 from 50 
Dutch listed companies are criticized
7.   Early 2004, the AFM issued a press release to 
urge companies to adhere to guidelines that were very similar to Regulation G
8. This led 
to discussions in the financial press. Royal NIVRA pressed external auditors and their 
clients that GAAP net income should be paramount in financial reports and that exotic 
                                                 
5 The discussion, although rather technical, reached the non-financial press as well.  See for example “Five 
lessons from Enrons bankruptcy ” (Vijf lessen uit het bankroet van Enron, De Volkskrant, 19 January 
2002) and “An earnings measure for every company” (Elke onderneming een eigen winstbegrip, De 
Volkskrant, 14 May 2002) 
6 See Hooghiemstra and Van der Tas, (2003), “Reporting Financial Performance” (Rapportering over 
financial performance), in: Backhuijs, R.G. Bosman and  Knoops, Het jaar 2002 verslagen. Onderzoek 
jaarverslaggeving Nederlandse ondernemingen, Kluwer/Koninklijk NIVRA and Hooghiemstra and Van der 
Tas, (2004), “Disclosure on performance indicators “(Informatieverschaffing over prestatie-indicatoren), in: 
Backhuijs et al., Het jaar 2003 verslagen. Onderzoek jaarverslaggeving Nederlandse ondernemingen, 
Kluwer/Koninklijk NIVRA, 2004. 
7 See “AFM critical towards the quality of annual reports” (“AFM kritisch over kwaliteit jaarverslagen” 
Het Financieele Dagblad, 5 December 2003) 
8 “Non Gaap Earnings measures”, press release published by the AFM, 17 February 2004 
9 alternative measures should be banned.
9 As net income is the only earnings measure 
uniquely defined by GAAP, it should remain the most important measure. Audit firms 
argued that financial disclosures in press releases should be regulated similarly to SOX
10. 
Despite this regulatory riot, no specific regulation was issued to address the issue. 
  To summarize, the reporting of non-GAAP measures has led to discussions in the 
U.S and the Netherlands. Although faced with a similar challenge, the response of 
regulators in the Netherlands as compared to the U.S. has been fundamentally different. 
In contrast to the SEC in the U.S., Dutch regulatory agencies such as the DASB and the 
AFM did not issue any specific rules for the disclosure of non-GAAP information in 
press releases. However, there was substantial media attention for the practice of 
publishing non-GAAP earnings, warning against misleading and confusing use of 
alternative measures and advocating rehabilitation of GAAP net income. Overall, the 
Dutch environment of non-GAAP reporting is characterised by the absence of specific 
regulation directed at banning non-GAAP earnings reporting practices in combination 
with negative attention from regulators and media. This provides an interesting 
opportunity to explore whether the financial reporting practices and investors’ response 
change without regulatory intervention. 
 
 
Earnings debate in the Dutch press 
In order to get a more comprehensive picture of the changing conditions surrounding 
non-GAAP reporting, we perform a search in all Dutch written newspapers in the years 
1999-2005 as available in Lexis Nexis. As already explained, we argue that media 
attention is expected to influence behaviour of financial market participants (i.e. 
companies and investors). We use newspaper coverage as a proxy for media attention. 
Since regulators actively participate in the newspaper discussions by writing opinion 
articles and giving interviews, newspaper coverage captures pressure from regulators as 
well. We search for articles that specifically cover the earnings-measures debate. These 
                                                 
9 “Nivra demands rehabilitation of original net earnings” (Nivra eist eerherstel oud winstbegrip, Het 
Financieele Dagblad, 14 January 2004)  
10  “Ebitda prohibited in press releases” (Ebitda taboe in persberichten, Het Financieele Dagblad, 23 
February 2004). 
10 articles typically acknowledge the fact that earnings is a hybrid concept that can be 
calculated in various ways. We use several text strings
11 for our searches in order to 
capture all the newspaper articles published on the subject. For each article, we determine 
if the central message deals with the earnings debate. For example, we remove articles 
that report the earnings announcement of a specific company and mention an earnings 
metric in the context of that announcement, without critically reflecting on the pro’s and 
con’s of that particular metric.  
 Our search yields a total of 96 newspaper articles of which 42 were published in 
the Dutch financial newspaper Het Financieele Dagblad (The Financial Daily). The 
articles published in the financial newspaper as well as the press in general all had a 
rather critical tone, warning against misleading reporting practices. As reproduced in 
Figure 2, the flow of articles seems to build up to a peak in 2002, after which the number 
decreases again.   
 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
Roughly one third (33 of 96) of the newspapers articles concerning the discussion of 
earnings measures were published in 2002. In 2004, we see another spike in the interest 
in the earnings debate. This time, the attention was motivated by concurrent statements of 
AFM and Royal NIVRA. They called up companies and their auditors to adhere to 
GAAP earnings as the most important earnings measure and to refrain from confusing 
non-GAAP measures. This led to an elaborate debate in the newspapers in January and 
February of 2004 (17 of the 26 articles of 2004). The statements by the AFM and Royal 
Nivra may be considered evidence of the influence of media attention on regulators. As a 
result of the negative press of non-GAAP measures, regulators felt they had to respond 
and issued a statement. 
The spread of the newspaper coverage supports the notion that 2002 is an 
important year in the earnings debate. In the year where accounting was front-page news, 
                                                 
11 We use variations of ‘alternative’ or a synonym in combination with ‘definition of earnings’ (in Dutch: 
“winstbegrip”) or similar wordings. A second search uses Ebitda (and variations) in combination with a 
financial market institution (DASB, AFM, Nivra) or references to financial reporting (financial statements, 
annual report etc.) Together, we use 32 search words in different combinations. 
11 substantial attention was paid to more technical topics such as alternative earnings 
measures. This set the spotlight on misleading reporting practices of non-GAAP earnings 
measures.  During the first years of our sample (2000-2002) the negative attention for the 
use of non-GAAP earnings measures increased. We identify 2002 as the most important 
year in this discussion, as the legislation concerning the use of non-GAAP information in 
the U.S. became effective and the first European accounting scandals occurred. In our 
empirical analyses we measure the effects of media attention in two ways: (1) we 
examine whether non-GAAP reporting behaviour by companies changes and (2) we 
examine whether investors respond differently to GAAP and non-GAAP earnings 
measures before and after negative media attention. We therefore divide our sample in 
two periods: press releases that were issued before and after January 1 2003. 
SAMPLE SELECTION 
We retrieve the quarterly earnings announcements from the companies’ websites in order 
to obtain the earnings release in its original format. Under Dutch regulation, only (half-) 
year reports are compulsory, but the majority of the companies voluntarily publish 
quarterly earnings releases. 
 For Dutch companies, comprehensive historical analyst data is not available in a 
database. Although our choice to collect non-GAAP measures from original earnings 
releases instead of commercial analyst databases is not a voluntary one, it has some 
advantages. For example,  it leads to more accurate information on the reporting 
behaviour of companies. Adjustments to GAAP earnings made by analysts are not 
necessarily the same as those reported by firms in their press releases. When compared, 
non-GAAP earnings as reported in press releases on average differ significantly from the 
street earnings reported by analysts (Bhattacharya et al (2003), Marques (2006)).  
The Dutch capital market is relatively small, allowing us to collect all earnings 
press releases of listed companies (large and midcap), and determine whether they report 
non-GAAP earnings measures or not. This provides a more comprehensive picture of 
reporting practices in earnings announcements. Prior studies with U.S. data used text 
searches in order to collect a sample of non-GAAP reporting companies (f.e. 
Bhattacharya et al., 2003, Lougee and Marquardt, 2004). This way, only the earnings 
12 releases with the ex ante defined non-GAAP measures can be selected, which may lead to 
self-selection problems.  
We hand-collect the quarterly, half-year and annual earnings releases of 
companies that were listed at Euronext Amsterdam (large- and midcap indexes), issued 
between 2000 and April 2005
12.  In line with prior research, we refer to the collected data 
as firm-quarters, regardless of the frequency of the reports. Our initial sample consists of 
766 earnings releases, reported in 21 different quarters for a total of 56 companies. This 
sample will be used to provide insight into the non-GAAP reporting behaviour of 
companies. As set out in Table 1, data required to examine market reactions is only 
available for 545 press releases. Therefore our analyses of the response of to the different 
earnings measures, which will be presented in the next section, is based on the final 
sample of 545 press releases. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
For each of the firm-quarters we read and code earnings releases and list the earnings 
measures reported. We focus on the non-GAAP earnings measure that is reported first in 
the earnings release. Our assumption is that this is the non-GAAP measure that 
management wants to put emphasis on. We define an earnings metric to be non-GAAP if 
the measure is not defined under Dutch regulation. Under Dutch law, the presentation 
format of the profit and loss account is prescribed.
13 The Dutch standard setter DASB has 
emphasized in 2001 that the prescribed formats should not be altered in order to present 
measures such as EBITA or EBITDA as a subtotal. In light of this view, we consider 
measures that do not fit in the prescribed models of the profit and loss account to be non-
GAAP (NONGAAP)
14. 
In contrast, GAAP earnings are defined as either bottom-line earnings or a 
recognized subtotal of the profit and loss account not in violation with the prescribed 
                                                 
12 The collected press releases concern reporting quarters from the fourth quarter of 1999 upto and 
including the fourth quarter of 2004. For the purpose of our analyses, we classify the earnings releases 
depending on the year in which they were published. 
13 In Dutch referred to as ‘Modellenbesluit’. This means that every line item is defined and all line items 
should appear in a pre-specified sequence. 
 
13 model, such as earnings before extraordinary items. Within these GAAP measures, we 
distinguish operating result (OPERGAAP) from bottom-line earnings (EARNGAAP). 
Proponents of non-GAAP measures claim that these adjusted GAAP measures provide 
more insight into a company’s permanent earnings by excluding transitory items. This 
can result in non-GAAP measures referred to as adjusted bottom-line measures or 
adjusted operating measures, depending on the items that management considers to be 
transitory. In order to compare the information content of the different measures we need 
both operating GAAP and bottom-line GAAP. 
 
THE NON-GAAP REPORTING BEHAVIOUR OF COMPANIES 
We begin with an exploratory analysis of the way Dutch companies report non-GAAP 
measures in their earnings press releases. We measure the popularity of earnings 
measures in both the frequency and the prominence with which they are reported.  Of our 
initial sample of 766 earnings releases, 523 (68%) contain at least one non-GAAP 
earnings measure. The companies that report these self-constructed measures present 
them prominently in their earnings press releases. In 341 firm quarters, a non-GAAP 
earnings measure is emphasised by reporting it before GAAP earnings (45% of the total 
sample, 65% of the non-GAAP releases). Figure 3 graphically illustrates the development 
of non-GAAP reporting over time.  The frequency of reporting non-GAAP measures 
increases steadily over the period 2000-2005 (from 55% to 83 %). Furthermore, non-
GAAP earnings are reported more often as the first and therefore primary earnings 
measure. In 2005 55% of the press releases publish a non-GAAP measure first, as 
compared to 30% in 2000.  Based on this evidence, it seems the popularity of non-GAAP 
reporting has not declined in a period of negative media attention. Instead, the increasing 
trend seems to continue after the turbulent year 2002. 
 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
 
At first glance, the growing popularity of non-GAAP reporting suggests that 
companies continue their allegedly misleading reporting behaviour when there is no 
specific regulation to stop them. However, if companies are aware of increased scrutiny 
14 or scepticism towards non-GAAP reporting, they may have more incentives to report 
these measures in an informative manner. So, although non-GAAP reporting is 
increasingly popular, the motivation underlying non-GAAP reporting decisions may have 
changed. We therefore analyze if the non-GAAP measures are used (more or less) 
opportunistically. For example, if companies report non-GAAP to mislead investors, we 
would expect the non-GAAP measures to be more favourable than the GAAP measures. 
A simple way to measure this is to compare the frequency of non-GAAP profits to the 
frequency of GAAP profits in our sample. In our initial sample of 766 press releases, 
93% of the reported non-GAAP earnings measures are a profit, compared to 77% of 
GAAP bottom-line earnings or 78% of GAAP operating earnings. On average, non-
GAAP measures present a more favourable view of a firm’s financial performance. For 
companies in the U.S., similar results have been reported
15. Additionally, if non-GAAP 
earnings are used opportunistically to avoid a loss, we expect to see non-GAAP being 
reported more frequently in case of a GAAP loss. We therefore split the sample in 
GAAP-loss quarters and GAAP-profit quarters. Furthermore, to analyse the changes in 
the sample period, we partition the sample in the period before 2003 and from 2003 
onward. The results are presented in Figure 4.  
 
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
 
In general, companies report non-GAAP measures more frequently and more 
prominently in GAAP-loss quarters than in GAAP-profit quarters. This is consistent with 
the assumption of loss-avoidance or at least distracting the attention from a loss. When 
we look at the changes before and after the negative press coverage, we notice that the 
reporting behaviour in a loss situation is virtually unchanged after the negative media 
attention in 2002. In profit situations on the other hand, companies report alternative 
earnings measure more frequently and more prominently than before the negative media 
                                                 
15 (Bhattacharya et al. (2003)) report 66% pro forma profits compared to 52% GAAP operating 
earnings profits. Although a direct comparison with our results is difficult because of differences in 
research design (f.e. different sample selection), it seems that non-GAAP disclosures are at least as 
favourable in the Netherlands as they are in the U.S. 
 
15 attention. A GAAP-loss seems to curb companies’ growing enthusiasm towards non-
GAAP reporting. A possible explanation is that companies may feel that the bad news of 
a loss harms the credibility of a positive non-GAAP number. Overall, the frequency and 
prominence of non-GAAP reporting are consistent with an opportunistic use of non-
GAAP measures that continues despite negative media attention. 
Next, we look at the frequency of specific exclusions to see if the increasing 
popularity of non-GAAP reporting is driven by other changes in the financial reporting 
environment. As Entwistle et al. (2006) suggest, the exclusion of certain items may be 
influenced by changes in accounting standards (for example goodwill amortization) or 
changes in the business environment (for example acquisition related charges). For each 
earnings press release, we tabulate the items that are excluded from GAAP earnings to 
arrive at the reported non-GAAP earnings measure. Based on the descriptions of the non-
GAAP measures in the earnings releases, we identify 22 different categories. A list of the 
exclusions is provided in Table 2. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
In total, we identify 1268 exclusions from 523 non-GAAP measures. On average, 
a non-GAAP measure excludes 2.4 items from GAAP earnings. This number is stable 
throughout the sample period, suggesting that the average complexity of the non-GAAP 
measures remains fairly stable. On the other hand, the variation of non-GAAP measures 
has grown, since the number of categories of exclusions increases from 17 to 21.    
When comparing the period before the negative media attention (before 2003) 
with the period after (2003 and after), the overall picture looks relatively stable with 10 
types of exclusions increasing and 11 decreasing. From the 523 non-GAAP measures, 
371 exclude amortization charges. This supports the expectation that the change in the 
accounting treatment of goodwill precipitated the use of non-GAAP measures. When we 
compare the two periods, we see a significant decrease in the frequency with which 
amortization is excluded from GAAP earnings. This may coincide with an alternative 
accounting treatment of goodwill that was gaining popularity in this period, according to 
which goodwill is not amortized but instead tested for impairment annually. This 
16 explanation is also consistent with the significant increase from 0 to 15 exclusions of 
impairments. The changes in accounting procedures for goodwill are reflected in non-
GAAP reporting. Adjustments related to goodwill (amortization and impairment) have 
decreased from 77.8% to 70.8%. Since the frequency decreases, this development does 
not drive the growing popularity of non-GAAP measures.  
Our results reveal a simultaneous relative decrease in non-operating items, 
depreciation and amortization. This implies that EBITDA –type earnings measures have 
become less popular after negative media attention, which may be influenced by the 
guidance issued by the DASB reinforcing that EBITDA and similar measures cannot be 
reported in the income statement. Again, this change in the accounting environment does 
not explain the growing popularity of non-GAAP reporting. 
Another accounting guideline that was issued during our sample period relates to 
the reporting of exceptional and extraordinary items
16. Exceptional and extraordinary 
charges are excluded 147 and 109 times respectively.  Presenting an earnings measure 
that excludes either extraordinary or exceptional items (or both) is increasingly popular.  
It seems that despite negative media attention companies continue to present non-GAAP 
measures. This development may be influenced by the stricter accounting guidelines with 
respect to the income statement. 
 Apart from regulatory accounting issues, changes in the economic environment 
may also explain the increasing frequency of particular items that are excluded. For 
example, acquisition items are influenced by the acquisition activity in the period. 
Pension charges are heavily influenced by demographic developments and the investment 
returns of pension funds.  From Table 2, we see that the frequency of these items does not 
change significantly. 
Finally, analyzing these exclusions also helps to distinguish between opportunistic 
and informative use of these measures. Assuming informative incentives for non-GAAP 
reporting would lead to a consistent way of reporting, we would expect companies to 
                                                 
16 During the sample period, the DASB issued an accounting standard that effectively prohibited labelling 
items as extraordinary (except in very rare cases such as earthquakes). Items that are no longer allowed to 
be categorized as extraordinary are presented as exceptional items under the new accounting standard. In 
Table 2, we see that excluding exceptional items from GAAP earnings has become more popular (with a 
significant increase from 52 to 95 exclusions). However, it is conspicuous that the relative decrease for 
extraordinary items is insignificant. Given the fact that standards issued by the DASB are not enforceable, 
it seems that companies ignored the rules pertaining to extraordinary items.  
17 report the same non-GAAP measure in its consecutive earnings releases. Moreover, 
companies would emphasize the same earnings measure in its press releases. Exploring 
the consistency with which the non-GAAP measures are being reported, we see that a 
stable proportion of our sample either switches the definition of the non-GAAP measure 
(41%-43%) or switches the measure they choose to report most prominently (30%-29%). 
Furthermore, in a small number of earnings releases, the company omits explaining the 
definition of the non-GAAP measure by either reporting an incomplete specification or 
no specification at all. Taken together, our analysis of the excluded items shows that there 
are some shifts in the use of non-GAAP earnings measures that may have been induced 
by changes in accounting standards, Moreover, some indicators of opportunistic 
disclosure (avoiding losses, switching behaviour, and incomplete specification) seem to 
prevail despite negative media attention in the more recent years. 
Overall, we do not find evidence for a disciplining effect of negative media 
attention on the reporting of non-GAAP metrics. Companies continue to report non-
GAAP measures and do so more frequently and more prominently, even after negative 
media attention. The increasing popularity of the non-GAAP measures cannot be 
explained solely by the influence of accounting standards or a changing business 
environment. While some accounting changes have had an impact on non-GAAP 
reporting (EBITDA-type earnings measures have become less popular due to changes in 
goodwill treatment), the use of exceptional and extraordinary items has increased over 
time. Moreover, we find that several indicators of opportunistic non-GAAP reporting 
practices persist after the negative attention. Thus, although the media repeatedly brand 
non-GAAP reporting as confusing and misleading, companies seem to ignore this 
message.  
 
INVESTORS’ USE OF NON-GAAP MEASURES 
 
In order to determine investors’ use of non-GAAP earnings measures as compared to 
GAAP earnings, we examine the informativeness of the identified earnings metrics.  A 
18 standard event study procedure is used to assess if stock prices change in response to the 
different earnings measures disclosed in the press releases
17.  
We use a random-walk earnings expectations model where we define unexpected 
earnings as the three EPS figures (GAAP, operational GAAP and non-GAAP) minus 
GAAP earnings from quarter q-4.  We use unexpected earnings instead of forecast errors, 
because  analyst forecast data is lacking for Dutch companies during our sample period. 
We calculate three measures of unexpected earnings or earnings surprise: UE GAAP, UE 
OGAAP and UE NONGAAP.. On average, the non-GAAP measures result in unexpected 
earnings of 5.3%, compared to UE GAAP of minus 0.2%. The mean market 
capitalisation MCAP (€10,397 million) is much higher than the median (€1,593 million), 
revealing that a few firms in our sample are much larger than most of the sample firms. 
This is in fact a characteristic feature of the Dutch financial market, which is dominated 
by a few large multinational companies. 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
We first examine which definition of earnings investors pay attention to: non-GAAP 
earnings or GAAP earnings (either bottom-line or operating). To gain insight into the 
degree to which the market is processing each measure in prices, we investigate short-
window association between abnormal returns on each earnings surprise (unexpected 
earnings) measure separately. If the market finds non-GAAP earnings to be a better 
                                                 
17 The market model is used to calculate daily abnormal returns. We estimate the market model parameters 
for a pre-event estimation period of 100 trading days from of –110 to –10 days before the press release. 
Abnormal returns are computed during the event period. Our event period is from –10 to +10 days. 
Abnormal returns are then averaged across firms to generate the average abnormal return (AARt). 
Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR-1,+1) are calculated by summing the average abnormal returns 
for an event window [-1,+1 relative to the event date (i.e. the date of the press release), which is labeled day 
0.  
 
19 summary measure of performance, returns will be more highly correlated with UE 
NONGAAP than with UE GAAP or UE OGAAP.  
Table 4 presents the results of regressions of abnormal returns on unexpected 
earnings. The regression is estimated separately for UE GAAP, UE OGAAP and UE 
NONGAAP (Model 1-3 respectively). We do not estimate the regression for the three 
unexpected earnings metrics together, because of high correlations between the earnings 
definitions (correlations above 0.95). 
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
In the separate unexpected earnings regression reported in table 4, UE GAAP, UE 
OGAAP and UE NONGAAP are positively related to short window returns. The 
coefficients on both UE OGAAP and UE NONGAAP are significantly positive. These 
results indicate that the different definitions of unexpected earnings have different 
explanatory power with respect to short window abnormal stock returns. Remarkably, 
bottom-line earnings are informative whereas operating earnings are not. Normally it is 
argued that operating earnings are closer to core earnings and are therefore more relevant 
to investors. Furthermore, non-GAAP earnings are informative, which is in line with 
prior research.  Consistent with U.S. studies, we find that non-GAAP earnings are more 
informative than GAAP operating earnings (Bhattacharya et al., 2003), but this does not 
hold for GAAP earnings.  
If negative media attention has an effect on the way investors perceive non-GAAP 
information and if they adjust their behaviour accordingly, the information content of the 
respective earnings measures should change from 2003 onwards. The results of the 
regressions in these two periods are reported in Table 5. 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
The Models 1-3 depict the results of the regression in the period before 2003, the Models 
4-6 refer to the period 2003 until April 2005. Before 2003, both the bottom-line GAAP 
and the non-GAAP unexpected earnings measures are significantly positive. The 
20 coefficient on UE OGAAP is not significant during this period. This result is similar to 
the aggregated results for the entire period. So before 2003, investors seem to price both 
GAAP bottom-line earnings and non-GAAP earnings.  
In the second period (2003 and after) however, the results change. UE 
NONGAAP is no longer significant, while the unexpected earnings on bottom-line 
GAAP and operating GAAP earnings are significant (at the 10% level). According to our 
results, the decreased use of non-GAAP information coincides with an increasing 
popularity of operating GAAP earnings. The coefficient on UE OGAAP switches to a 
positive sign, and is significant. 
The coefficient on UE GAAP is statistically significant for the entire sample 
period as well as for the divided periods before and after 2003. This may suggests that 
bottom-line earnings are in fact informative to capital market participants. This 
contradicts the critics of bottom-line earnings, who claim that this earnings measure is not 
useful to investors because it includes items that are non-operating or transitory. The use 
of net income in financial reports is strongly encouraged by Dutch financial market 
authorities and regulators such as the DASB. Based on our results, it seems investors 
agree with the regulators on the importance of bottom-line GAAP earnings.  
The explanatory power (R
2) of our Models as reported in Table 4 and 5 is low, but 
in line with other research (Bhattacharya, et al., 2003). We calculate Vuong’s (1989) Z-
statistic to compare the explanatory power of the Models and find that for the entire 
period EARNGAAP and NONGAAP have significantly more explanatory power than 
OPERGAAP, suggesting that investors find operating GAAP the least informative 
earnings measure. This result holds for the first period of our sample, before the negative 
media attention. After negative media attention, the explanatory power of the Models 
does not differ significantly, suggesting that investors find the earnings measures equally 
(un)informative. 
We perform additional tests to determine if our results are robust for alternate 
model specifications. First, we test if our results are sensitive to the exact date that we 
chose to separate the observations before the negative media attention from the ones after 
(1 January 2003). While remaining within the boundaries of the period of intensified 
media attention, we shift the date partitioning the sample one quarter backward (30 
21 September 2002) and forward (30 March 2003) and run the regressions again. We find 
similar results, suggesting our findings are not sensitive to the exact date. Furthermore, 
we repeat our regressions after excluding firms with a cross listing at a U.S. exchange. 
The results are consistent with the results for the entire sample. This alleviates concerns 
that our findings are driven by cross-listed firms that respond to the regulation in the U.S. 
Finally, in addition to the tabulated results, we performed the regressions including the 
market capitalization five days before the press release was published. The results of this 
test are similar to the models excluding market capitalization.  
Collectively, our analyses of investors’ response to non-GAAP reporting suggest 
investors’ behaviour changes after negative media attention and in the absence of a 
specific regulatory change. Investors do not respond to non-GAAP measures, while they 
did react positively before 2003. In combination with the evidence of persistent 
opportunistic non-GAAP reporting practices, it seems investors find non-GAAP 







In this paper, we investigate the use of different definitions of earnings: earnings 
calculated according to generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP earnings, both 
bottom-line and operating) and alternative versions of earnings that exclude various items 
recorded under GAAP (non-GAAP earnings). Our study is placed in the turbulent period 
were financial scandals are front-page news and investors trust is on a historical low. 
During this period, influenced by the accounting scandals in the U.S. and the Netherlands, 
the use of alternative earnings measures received negative media attention. The Dutch 
setting offers us the unique possibility to study the effect of the negative attention while 
the rules and regulations remain the same as before the scandals.  
We find that companies do not change their reporting behaviour despite the 
negative media attention. Investors on the other hand seem to take the warnings more 
22 seriously and turn away from non-GAAP measures. We also show that from 2003 on, 
investors consider GAAP earnings to be informative, whereas they do not price non-
GAAP earnings measures. This contrasts with the findings before 2003, where investors 
seem to find non-GAAP earnings useful, as well as bottom-line GAAP earnings. 
Collectively, our findings suggest that market participants perceive non-GAAP earnings 
measures to be less informative after a gradual change in reporting environment. 
This study is important to regulators and standard setters. It seems that critical 
opinions in the media and warnings by regulators expressed through the media are 
effective means to create awareness among investors, but not to alter companies reporting 
behaviour. U.S. studies suggest that specific regulation has successfully restrained 
opportunistic non-GAAP reporting practices. On the other hand, there is evidence that the 
SEC regulation leads to suboptimal reporting decisions (Kolev et al., 2006). Our results 
cast doubt on the attribution of changes in investor behaviour to the effect of regulation 
and suggest that investor perceptions can change without regulation. This potentially has 
important implications for regulation effectiveness studies that evaluate the effect of new 
regulations on the behaviour of market participants.  
Our study may serve as an indication that we need to expand our understanding of 
the effect of regulation. In order to evaluate the effectiveness and necessity of the 
regulation of financial markets, we need to understand the effect of concurrent changes in 
the environment that may influence behaviour of financial markets participants. For 
example, media attention can induce reputation effects that discipline reporting behaviour 
or create awareness among the users of financial information. We report evidence that 
suggests that investors base their decisions on different earnings metrics after negative 
attention from media and regulators. Such effects may decrease the necessity of 
additional regulation. In order to disentangle the effects of regulation and reporting 
environment, more research in an international setting may be fruitful. 
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TIMELINE: EVENTS AND REGULATORY CHANGES INFLUENCING THE 
FINANCIAL REPORTING ENVIRONMENT FOR NON-GAAP DISCLOSURES 
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Earnings debate in the Dutch press. The number of newspaper articles that appeared in 
Dutch newspapers from 2000-2005 that dealt primarily with the debate on different 
earnings definitions. 
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Frequency (relative to the total number of press releases in our sample for the year) of 
press releases containing a non-GAAP measure and frequency of non-GAAP earnings 
metrics reported as the first earnings measure  (primary measure)  in the year of 
publication. 
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Comparison of earnings metrics in reporting a profit versus a loss.situation  
EARNGAAP refers to bottom-line GAAP earnings. 
NONGAAP refers to earnings measures that are not defined by accounting standards 
accepted in the Netherlands. 





 SAMPLE SELECTION 
    
 
Companies listed AEX/AMX 1999-2004    70
No press releases available  [a] 14
   56
    
Theoretical initial sample  [b] 1.176
Archive starts later than 1999q4    188
Firm report semi-annually  [c] 189
   799
Missing release    33
Sample for descriptive analysis    766
  
No data for q-4    215
Insufficient data to estimate market model    6
Final sample    545
  
 
[a] The following firms are removed from the list (necessary data not available, often 
merger-related): ASR Verzekeringen, Baan, Cap Gemini, CMG, Endemol, Gucci, KPN 
Qwest, Libertel, Pakhoed, PinkRoccade, Rodamco Asia, UPC, Vodafone Libertel and 
Volker Wessels.  
[b] 21 quarters of 56 companies would lead to a maximum of 1.218 earnings releases 
[c] Listed companies at the Amsterdam Stock Exchange are not required to report 
quarterly but semi-annually. Therefore in the first and in the third quarter a number of 














Non-Operating Items  114  50,7% 145  48,7% 259 
Depreciation
a 69 30,7%  53 17,8%  122 
Amortization
a 175  77,8% 196  65,8% 371 
Impairment
a 0  0,0% 15  5,0% 15 
Exceptional Items
b 52 23,1%  95 31,9%  147 
Extraordinary Items  52 23,1%  57 19,1%  109 
Restructuring 
Charges  14  6,2% 14  4,7% 28 
Acquisition related 
charges  3  1,3% 1  0,3% 4 
Sale of assets
c 0  0,0% 5  1,7% 5 
Share Compensation 
Expense
a 12 5,3%  2 0,7%  14 
R&D




b 14  6,2% 34  11,4% 48 
Current cost 
valuation  10 4,4%  9 3,0%  19 
Foreign Currency  10  4,4% 13  4,4% 23 
Provisions/accruals  7  3,1% 10  3,4% 17 
Discontinued 
operations  8  3,6% 12  4,0% 20 
Realized investment 
gains/losses  11  4,9% 13  4,4% 24 
Rent  5 2,2%  6 2,0%  11 
Penalties/Claims
c 3  1,3% 11  3,7% 14 
Pension charges  0  0,0% 2  0,7% 2 
Finance related 
charges  0  0,0% 3  1,0% 3 
Excluded Segments
b 0  0,0% 6  2,0% 6 
TOTAL 
EXCLUSIONS  566   702    1268 
       
no specification   4 1,8%  9  3,0%   
incomplete 
specification  5 2,2%  9  3,0%   
       
Switched primary 
measure  67 29,8%  86 28,9%  153 
Switched definition of 
non-GAAP measure  93  41,3% 128  43,0% 221 
         
 
For each exclusion we test whether the percentages are equal across the two periods.  For exclusions with superscript a ,b or c 






        
Variable Mean  Median  Standard 
deviation 
N 
EARN GAAP  255.991 44.000 952.908  538 
EARN OGAAP  433.674 69.000 1,329.333  363 
EARN NONGAAP  474.054 106.000 870.280  381 
UE GAAP  -0.002 0.001 0.053  538 
UE OGAAP  0.018 0.017 0.072  363 
UE NONGAAP  0.052 0.022 0.090  381 
MCAP 10,397.640 1,592.690 19,653.910  545 
CAR (%)  -0.073 -0.430 7.376  545 
 
Note: Table shows summary statistics for quarterly earnings press releases issued by 
Dutch listed companies from January 2000 to April 2005. EARN GAAP, EARN OGAAP 
and NONGAAP-EARN denote the GAAP earnings, operational GAAP earnings and 
non-GAAP earnings (in millions of euros), respectively. UE GAAP, UE OGAAP and UE 
NONGAAP denote the unexpected earnings (earnings surprise) for GAAP, operational 
GAAP and non-GAAP earnings, respectively. We use the random model to compute 
unexpected earnings and use the GAAP earnings four quarters earlier as our proxy for 
expected earnings. The UE GAAP is computed as (EARN GAAP-EARN GAAP (q-
4))/MCAP, UE OGAAP is computed as (EARN OGAAP-EARN GAAP (q-4))/MCAP 
and UE NONGAAP is computed as (EARN NONGAAP-EARN GAAP (q-4))/MCAP. 
The unexpected earnings (earnings surprise) is trimmed at the 5
th and 95
th percentile. 
MCAP denotes the market capitalization five trading days before the press release (in 
millions of euros). CAR denotes the cumulative abnormal return during the three trading 






 REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
 Model  (1)  Model 
(2) 
Model (3) 


















2   0.012  0.001  0.015 
F-statistic 6.684***  0.363  5.916
***
Number of observations  538  363  381 
 
Comparison of earnings measures 






















Note: Table shows the regression results using CAR as the dependent variable. 
We refer to Table 3 for variable definitions. t-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
* 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level (one-tailed), 
** statistically significant at the 
5 percent level (one-tailed) and 







THE RISE AND FALL OF VALUE RELEVANCE OF NON-GAAP EARNINGS 
 
  Before negative media attention  After negative media attention 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4)  Model (5)  Model (6) 
UE GAAP  0.207 
(2.140)** 
  0.108 
(1.522)* 
  
UE OGAAP    -0.021 
(-0.240) 





   0.130 
(1.808)
**
















2    0.018  0.001 0.020 0.008 0.010 0.006 





248  160 166 290 203 215 
Comparison of earnings measures 
  Before negative media attention  After negative media attention 








6.76 <0.0001 0.42 0.6759
NONGAAP vs. 
EARNGAAP 
0.55 0.5831 -0.66 0.5110
OPERGAAP 
vs. NONGAAP 
4.29 <0.0001 1.02 0.3103
 
       
Note: Table shows the regression results using CAR as the dependent variable. 
We refer to Table 3 for variable definitions. We split the sample in observations before 
and after the negative media attention received in 2002.  t-statistics are shown in 
parentheses. 
* statistically significant at the 10 percent level (one-tailed), 
** statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level (one-tailed) and 
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